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 When the New 
York Yankees lost to the Texas Rangers 
in the 2010 ALCS, it really hurt. Sure, 
losing always hurts when your team man-
tra is ―World Series-or-bust,‖ but the 
Yankees had this coming. That past sum-
mer, they nixed a deal with the Seattle 
Mariners for pitcher Cliff Lee upon re-
quest that the Yankees add prospect 
shortstop Eduardo Núñez to an already 
lucrative package of young players. 
Hours later, Lee was shipped to Texas, 
where he helped lead the Rangers to their 
first American League pennant, knocking 
out the defending champion Yankees on 
the way. After digesting this ironic twist, 
New York fans could say just one thing: 
―Núñez had better be the next Derek 
Jeter.‖ 
 It may be fair to say that Yan-
kees fans have simply been captivated by 
the organization‘s singularly high stand-
ards of success. But perhaps there is in-
deed something more substantial to their 
grievances. Maybe General Manager Bri-
an Cashman should have pulled the trig-
ger on the Lee deal, acquiring an ace that 
could have propelled his Yankees into a 
tier of their own. GMs walk a fine line in 
cases like this one. So where does that 
line lie?  When is it smart to sacrifice 
future potential for present value?  The 
short answer is just about always. 
 In baseball, discounting the fu-
ture is a risky game to play. The future is 
never guaranteed, making it wise to capi-
talize on existing opportunity whenever 
possible. Examining the Baseball Pro-
spectus statistic Wins Above Replace-
ment  (WAR), we can explore this phe-
nomenon further. WAR measures the 
additional wins contributed by a given 
player in comparison to a theoretical mar-
ginal or ―replacement level‖ player. Us-
ing WAR, we can standardize the levels 
 
 Win Now or Win Later? 
The dilemma of whether to trade prospects for a proven player is not uncommon in 
Major League Baseball. Many teams worry that trading away top prospects will ruin 
the future of the franchise. But is this really the case? How often should teams choose 
the proven player over the prospect? 
By Will Candell, ILR ’ 13  
   wmc46@cornell.edu 
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of contribution by a top draft pick, or a 
―future‖ player, versus the value added by 
a veteran star, or a ―present‖ player.  
 Consider the top draft picks in 
the 2003-2006 MLB Amateur Drafts 
(Figure 1). The Amateur Draft was de-
signed with the intention of creating pari-
ty. In practice, however, it has simply 
reaffirmed the importance of organiza-
tional orientation towards the present. 
Figure 1 illustrates the Major League per-
formance of the first five overall picks in 
the 2003-2006 drafts. These years were 
chosen because these players have been 
under control of teams for at least five 
seasons, enough time to adequately devel-
op and contribute at the Major League 
level. 
 To account for the fact that we 
are examining WAR over a course of 
several seasons, and that each player has 
had a different amount of Major League 
experience, we will assess WAR on a per 
game basis. The average WAR/G of these 
twenty top picks is .027.  To put this into 
perspective, Rangers outfielder Josh 
Hamilton lead all position players with 
a .06 WAR/G in 2010, while Atlanta 
Braves‘ outfielder Melky Cabrera boasted 
a league worst -.008 WAR/G.  Thus, the 
―future‖ players fall squarely between the 
two endpoints, just below the 50th percen-
tile. 
 Examining more closely, we see 
that the first overall picks have had an 
average WAR/G of .024. Benchmarking 
this number, San Diego‘s Jon Garland 
had the seventh worst WAR/G among 
pitchers in 2010 at .03. Colby Rasmus of 
the St. Louis Cardinals ranked 58th among 
all hitters with a WAR/G of .024. In other 
words, the first 
overall picks — 
the so-called 
―prospects‖ — 
contributed mar-
ginally, at best. 
 Perhaps 
the lack of con-
tribution by first 
overall picks was 
simply a fluke. Actually, from 2003-
2006, the most successful players were 
the second overall picks, averaging .037 
WAR/G. This figure is closest to the 2010 
WAR/Gs of Braves‘ catcher Brian 
McCann and Tampa Bay Rays‘ pitcher 
Jeff Niemann. An acceptable level of 
production? Probably. But it should be 
noted that this number was greatly lever-
aged by the fact that the 2003 and 2004 
second overall picks were the successful 
Rickie Weeks and Justin Verlander.  
 The results for the third, fourth 
and fifth overall picks do not bode much 
better for proponents of building for the 
future. The number three spot yields play-
ers analogous to Rodrigo Lopez, the 
fourth to Wade Davis and the fifth to Jer-
emy Bonderman. These players ranked 
3rd, 6th and 8th worst, respectively, in 
league WAR/G among pitchers in 2010. 
 That is not to say that all top 
picks amount to nothing. Evan Longoria, 
Ryan Braun and Ryan Zimmerman, for 
instance, have all established themselves 
as premier players in Major League Base-
ball. But we also see that, holistically, 
these top twenty draft picks amounted to 
remarkably little in terms of contribution 
to their respective organizations. In other 
words, the players who are believed to 
have the most potential are, on average, 
simply average. Granted, a team never 
Cliff Lee contributed 3.1 WAR for the Texas Rangers in the second half of the 2010 sea-
son. The New York Yankees are hoping that the prospects they balked at trading for Lee 
will eventually combine to give them that level of production. 
MLB 
Jon Garland’s WAR/G of .03 — good for seventh worst among pitchers in 2010 — is 
comparable to the average WAR/G for the first overall pick from 2003-2006. 
First overall picks — the so-called 
“prospects” — contributed marginally, 
at best. 
 6 Sports, Inc.   
really knows whether it will end up with 
an Evan Longoria or a Matt Bush. But 
assuming any given draft pick will result 
in something in between, it makes sense 
to opt for current certainty over future 
potential.  
 Having established the risk of 
relying on draft picks, it is necessary to 
compare the value of these players to that 
of current stars. Over the past three sea-
sons, various pennant-vying teams have 
made deadline trades to bolster their Sep-
tember (and hopefully October) success.  
The midseason trade epitomizes our cen-
tral question: should a team trade future 
talent for a chance to win now? Figure 2 
illustrates eight players acquired at 
midseason between 2008 and 2010, as 
well as their WAR and WAR/G following 
the trade. 
 If we assume that teams treat all 
wins equally (that a win now is equal to a 
win at some point in the future), then 
midseason trades certainly seem shrewd. 
The average WAR/G for these six players 
is .11, compared to .026 for the ―future 
players‖. Moreover, the average post-
trade WAR for these players is 2.86, 
while the career WARs for ten of the top 
twenty draft picks does not even reach 
this number. In other words, these eight 
newly acquired players will contribute 
more wins to their new teams over less  
than half a season than half of the top 
draft picks will contribute to their teams 
throughout their entire careers.  
 So if the answer seems so clear-
cut, why do GMs seem to struggle so 
mightily over the trade-off between now 
and later? One reason teams may resist 
going through with a midseason trade is 
pending player free agency. These trade 
deadline players are often seen as 
―rentals,‖ used for a transient period of 
time and then finding work elsewhere. 
For this reason, the prospect of sacrificing 
future talent for what could be just a few 
months of success may be unsettling. The 
Yankees, for instance, knew that Cliff 
Lee would become a free agent following 
the 2010 World Series. Texas, however, 
was willing to take a risk, and was re-
warded by an otherworldly .2 WAR/G. 
Thus, even if Cliff Lee were to walk 
away at season‘s end (which he indeed 
did), Texas still benefited, gaining half of 
the number wins over several months that 
are contributed by the average ―future‖ 
player over his entire playing career. 
 One legitimate factor causing 
some teams to resist this principle is mar-
ket size. Smaller market teams may be 
less inclined than large market teams to 
part ways with young talent. For teams 
with low payrolls, such as the Pittsburgh 
Pirates and the San Diego Padres, the 
draft is the primary channel through 
which they can find and develop new 
talent. Given the current payroll gap 
(nearly $171 million in 2010), it is nearly 
impossible for small market teams to 
compete with the Yankees and Boston 
Red Sox of the world in free agency. The 
inability to purchase players renders pro-
spects all the more important, and thus 
may account for apprehension to value 
the present over the future.  
 Moreover, our assumption that 
―a win now equals a win in the future‖ is 
not entirely true for all teams. A team that 
finds itself twenty games out of the divi-
sion lead at the trade deadline has nothing 
to gain by acquiring a star player for sev-
eral months. The extra wins provided by 
this player may be futile for a team in 
such dire straits. That team is better off 
persevering its young players in the hopes 
that they will be more competitive in up-
coming seasons. 
 Through a close analysis, how-
ever, it becomes clear that, at least for the 
majority of teams, the future in baseball 
should not be discounted. The Yankees 
showed us first hand what happens when 
a team balks at a great opportunity, and 
other should take note of this blunder. 
The rest of baseball can also learn some-
thing else from the Yankees. Winning 
now is really all that matters.  
 
Sources: 
Baseball Statistics and Analysis | Fan-
Graphs Baseball. Web. 14 May 
2011. <http://www.  
              fangraphs.com/>.  
Win Now or Win Later? 
As measured by WAR, the eight players named in 
figure two contributed more wins to their teams in 
the half season following their trade than ten of the 
top twenty draft picks contributed over the course 
of their entire careers. 
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The Transformation of 
the US Open Course 
How the USGA changes courses from 
year to year to make the tournament 
more interesting for players and fans alike 
By Preston Gray, Hotel ’ 14  
     pdg56@cornell.edu 
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 Every year, the 
United States Golf Association holds its 
championship event: the U.S. Open. Be-
cause it is an open championship, it is 
open to any golfer who can make it 
through the qualifying rounds. Before the 
tournament begins however, months of 
preparation take place to change the host 
golf course and get it ready to host a U.S. 
Open. Many courses go through signifi-
cant layout and design changes that modi-
fy the course from how plays when com-
pared to its ordinary set up in addition the 
daily changes that occur during the tour-
nament.  While these changes are some-
what unfortunate because it makes it dif-
ferent from how a non-professional play-
er would play the course, they are often 
necessary to ensure the grueling competi-
tion players and fans have come to expect 
in a U.S. Open. It was often difficult for 
the individuals in charge with setting up 
the golf course to balance difficulty and 
fairness. However, the set up for the U.S. 
Open has changed significantly in the 
past five years and continues to evolve 
for the better. Many of these changes can 
be attributed to the Mike Davis‘ rein as 
senior director of Rules and Competition 
at the U.S.G.A. from 2005 until 2011.The 
U.S. Open used to cross the line between 
difficult and unfair course set ups regular-
ly, but with Mike Davis‘s arrival in the 
2005, the course setups have never been 
able to balance difficulty and fairness in a 
better way. 
 Prior to 2005, the U.S. Open had 
a reputation of being played on courses 
that had been set up unfairly. The rough 
was so thick players would usually need 
to punch out into the middle of the fair-
way even if they were only one foot into 
the rough. The penalty was the same for 
missing the fairway by one foot as it was 
by twenty yards. Many fans and players 
became frustrated by what was perceived 
as unfairness. During the 2002 U.S. Open 
held at Bethpage Black, one tee shot re-
quired a 248 yard carry into wind and on 
a colder day just to reach the fairway 
(Dolch). 
 In 2005, Mike Davis took over 
setting up golf courses for the U.S. Open. 
He introduced the idea of having graduat-
ed levels of rough so the rough gets deep-
er the further away the player is from the 
fairway (Dolch). This was a revolutionary 
idea and is now a trademark of the U.S. 
Open. Davis also experimented with mak-
ing drivable par fours that have become 
extremely interesting to watch. The way 
Davis sets up the golf course is truly 
spectacular, with setups often varying 
each day. Although most tournament di-
rectors will change the course slightly 
each day, Mike Davis made it common 
place to check the weather 
before determining pin and 
tee locations. (Dolch) 
 In 2007 when the 
U.S. Open was hosted by 
Oakmont, Davis lengthened 
the 8th to a record-breaking 
288 yard par three. Many 
players thought the idea was 
ridiculous before the tourna-
ment event started. Retief Goosen, a for-
mer U.S. Open champion, said it sounded 
―a bit silly‖ when he heard about the 
change. It seemed as if the USGA had 
reverted to its old, unfair ways. However, 
while 288 yards is certainly longer than 
the former 252 yard tee box, it gives the 
USGA versatility in their course set up. 
For example, if there is a strong wind 
helping the players, it gives the USGA 
the option to move the tees back a bit 
further to make up for that and overall 
gives them more control over the course 
(Dulac). 
 The main goals that direct the 
decision making about the course include 
ensuring fairness and difficulty at the 
same time and improving the quality of 
the action for spectators. A new theme to 
help increase the spectator‘s experience 
under Davis has been the idea of having a 
drivable par 4. This sets up a great risk-
reward situation for players and tests their 
control of the driver. At the 2006 U.S. 
Open at Winged Foot, the sixth hole was 
a 321 yard drivable par 4. In 2007 at Oak-
mont, the USGA set hole seventeen at 
313 yards—only twenty five yards longer 
than the par 3 seventh. The drivable par 
four had a great impact on different play-
ers. It was a test of their course manage-
ment. Should they take the risk and try 
and hit a driver off the tee or lay up with 
an iron? These types of decisions greatly 
influenced the outcome of the champion-
ship. In fact, Jim Furyk‘s chances at win-
ning the 2007 open were all but crushed 
after his attempt to drive the short par 
four‘s green left him in deep rough on the 
left hand side of the green.  
 Other common and minor 
changes made for the U.S. Open are nar-
rowing fairways, lengthening the course 
through building tee boxes, removing or 
constructing bunkers in different areas, 
cutting grass near water hazards to make 
the hazard more likely to come into play, 
and speeding up the greens by cutting and 
rolling them. Players also need to take 
these changes into account to prepare for 
the types of shots these changes will re-
quire. For instance, if a player knows that 
a water hazard will be more in play be-
cause the grass around it has been cut 
shortly (increasing the chances a ball will 
continue to roll into the hazard), they may 
If the changes to the course 
did not exist year to year, the 
U.S. Open would lose its ap-
peal as the toughest challenge 
in golf.  
Since Mike Davis was named Senior Director of Rules and Competition at the USGA in 
2005, the US Open has shed its label as an unfairly designed course.  
The Transformation of the U.S. Open Course 
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attempt to hit a curving shot from right to 
left or left to right. Usually if the hazard 
lies on the right of the hole, the player 
would attempt to start the ball to the left 
and allow it to work back to the right, 
giving them a larger margin for error and 
vice versa for a hazard on the left. 
 Yet another interesting area in 
the setup is the daily hole locations which 
probably has one of the larger impacts on 
how a player choses to play a hole. The 
USGA uses a balanced approach when 
making hole locations. They will try and 
make an even number of left and right 
pins as well as front and back pins. Addi-
tionally, they will check the weather fore-
cast for wind direction and speed when 
deciding on where to place the hole loca-
tions as well as which tee box to use. 
Nearly all of these changes contribute to 
making the course more difficult 
(USGA). 
 While these changes make the 
course different from its everyday set up, 
they contribute to a successful U.S. Open 
by making sure players cannot dominate 
the course. If the changes to the course 
did not exist year to year, the U.S. Open 
would lose its appeal 
as the toughest chal-
lenge in golf. The tour-
nament has a different 
feel from the Masters 
and PGA Champion-
ship where the winning 
scores are often much 
lower. The tradition of 
the open carries on in these changes that 
attempt to create a difficult course that is 
fair at the same time. 
 The way Mike Davis has 
changed the unfairness that used to be 
added by the way the golf course was set 
up has changed the U.S. Open for the 
better. They have done so without im-
pacting the difficulty of the golf course 
and made the event more enjoyable for 
players and fans to watch. The idea of 
creating vastly different set ups on a day-
to-day basis by changing hole locations 
and tee boxes has added to the variety 
players and fans see in each of the four 
rounds and prevents monotony from oc-
curring. Clearly, the U.S. Open has be-
come a better event because of the change 
in course set up philosophy.  
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The main goals that direct the deci-
sion making about the course include 
ensuring fairness and difficulty at the 
same time and  improving the quality 
of the action for spectators 
By introducing ideas such as graduated levels of rough, he has made the US Open course more interesting for competitors and spec-
tators alike. Phil Mickelson, pictured above, takes a stroke in the challenging US Open rough. 
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 With several of  
the games greatest stars changing teams, 
the much hyped summer of 2010 National 
Basketball Association (NBA) free agen-
cy certainly justified teams‘ decisions to 
clear their roster in anticipation of signing 
a superstar.  Rebuilding teams began 
clearing cap space as early as the Febru-
ary 2009 trade deadline for the mere po-
tential to add a star seventeen months 
later.  The February 2010 trade deadline 
and the 2010 NBA draft showed what 
great lengths teams went to in order to 
clear sufficient cap space for the upcom-
ing summer.  For example, he New York 
Knicks had to give the Houston Rockets 
their 2012 first round pick, 
Jordan Hill (the 8th overall pick 
in the 2009 NBA draft which 
took place less than eight 
months before Hill was traded) 
and the right to swap 2011 first 
round picks just to clear Jared 
Jeffries‘ seven million dollar 
salary off their 2010-2011 sala-
ry cap.  The Washington Wiz-
ards were compensated with a 
first round pick just for taking 
Kirk Hinrich and his nine mil-
lion dollar cap hit this season 
off of the Chicago Bulls hands.  
However, both the Knicks and 
Bulls were later rewarded when 
they signed Amar‘e 
Stoudemire and Carlos Boozer 
respectively.  These players 
played key roles in helping 
their teams win a combined 34 
more regular season games this 
season than their 2009-2010 
totals. 
 Although both teams 
signed quality free agent power 
 
 
 
The free agency of 2010 will undoubtedly affect negotiations in the upcoming collective bargaining 
agreement. Non-guaranteed contracts, a franchise tag, higher maximum contracts and the mid-
level exception will undoubtedly be issues discussed by NBA Players Association Executive Direc-
tor, Billy Hunter (Left) and NBA Commissioner, David Stern (Right) during the negotiations.  
 By Brian Fund, Engineering ’ 1 4  
       bsf48@cornell.edu 
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forwards, they came away from the sum-
mer of 2010 with less than they were hop-
ing for.  Both teams made such desperate 
moves in order to create enough cap 
space to sign up to two maximum con-
tract free agents (the NBA has a maxi-
mum that a player can be paid in the ini-
tial year of his contract) in hopes that a 
superstar would be more likely to sign 
with the team if he knew another star 
could sign with him, but neither team was 
able to sign two superstars.  The most 
successful team in terms of summer 2010 
free agency signings was the Miami Heat, 
who landed two-time MVP LeBron 
James and perennial all-star Chris Bosh 
while also retaining 2006 Finals MVP 
Dwyane Wade.  The Heat at one point 
only had Mario Chalmers, a backup point 
guard, on their roster in order to accom-
modate the trio under the salary cap.  The 
risk certainly paid off for the Heat, who 
now rank third in ESPN writer John Hol-
linger‘s NBA Future Power Rankings.        
 The Heat‘s jump in Hollinger‘s 
Future Rankings after adding only a few 
players is a strong reflection of the 
skewed talent distribution in the NBA.  
Players like James are extremely valuable 
relative to other players to the extent that 
teams like the Knicks and the Bulls 
would probably give up many of their 
assets again for another chance to sign 
him.  But there‘s only one LeBron James, 
and he will be wearing only one team‘s 
jersey for the next six years while smaller 
market teams like the Nets, Clippers, 
Kings, Bucks and Wizards who deprived 
themselves of assets will be playing in 
front of empty arenas for the next half 
decade, making almost no money for the 
league.  Roughly two thirds of the teams 
(nearly all of which are small market 
teams) in the league reported losing mon-
ey this past season (ESPN),  putting the 
immediate future of the league in seri-
ous jeopardy.  Yet, many would willingly 
employ the same strategy again in hopes 
to sign a superstar, for fear of fan discon-
tent with the apparent lack of effort to 
build a championship-caliber roster.  
Owners are in a lose-lose situation.  How 
does the NBA fix this problem?  Simple: 
dramatically decrease the potential (and 
incentive) for a team to sign a player like 
LeBron James to the point that fewer 
teams will risk mortgaging their next five 
seasons in the hopes of signing him.  
Here are some ways the league could 
modify its salary structure in the upcom-
ing collective bargaining agreement to do 
this: 
 
Have non-guaranteed player contracts 
 
The Knicks traded potentially three lot-
tery (top 14) picks (Hill, and their 2011 
and 2012 first round pick) for a lone 
Rockets‘ first round pick in order to avoid 
paying Jared Jeffries the seven million 
owed to him this season.  This move was 
deemed necessary by Knicks manage-
 
 
 
NBA 
Eliminating the midlevel exception would reduce the 
number of teams who would be willing to gut their roster 
to potentially sign a superstar to a large contract since it 
would become more difficult to surround a the superstar 
player with a roster capable of going deep into the 
playoffs.  
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ment because clearing Jeffries from the 
roster was the only conceivable way to 
create enough cap space for two maxi-
mum contracts.  But what if the Knicks 
were not obligated to pay Jeffries his sal-
ary and could avoid his cap hit without 
risking their future?  Non-guaranteed 
player contracts would do just this, and it 
would avoid having teams deplete them-
selves to ―undo‖ a cap-unfriendly con-
tract. 
 
Create a franchise tag 
 
This would be a borrowed concept from 
the National Football League (NFL).  The 
NFL lets each team designate one player 
per offseason that was on its roster the 
year before to ―franchise,‖ in which he 
must sign a contract that is either 120% of 
the salary he made the previous year or 
the average of the top 5 salaries at his 
position for the upcoming season 
(whichever is greater).  This ability would 
prevent other teams from trying to clear 
cap space for a superstar, since superstars 
such as LeBron James would be fran-
chised at all costs and would not be avail-
able on the open market.  Other teams 
would then not deplete their roster be-
cause there would be no po-
tential for them to sign these 
players.  While this has been 
discussed in negotiations for 
the upcoming collective bar-
gaining agreement, the fact 
that the Denver Nuggets re-
cently traded Carmelo Antho-
ny and the Utah Jazz traded 
Deron Williams in fear they 
could not resign them when 
their contracts expire indicates 
that the franchise tag will 
probably not be implemented 
into the upcoming collective 
bargaining agreement. 
 
Increase the maximum con-
tract 
 
The maximum contract‘s ex-
istence was the source of all of 
the problems created by the 
2010 free agency.  Teams like 
the Knicks were willing to trade 
away their future for the oppor-
tunity to pay LeBron James a 
maximum of 6 years $119 mil-
lion because this is much less than his 
actual value.  If the maximum contract 
was, say, thirty million dollars 
for the first season of the con-
tract (it‘s at about $14 million 
now), teams would be much 
less likely to deplete their ros-
ter if they had to pay a player 
close to his face value.  In 
addition, management would 
have to strategize more care-
fully, because the team that 
most desires the player will be 
able to make the best offer, 
rather than every team making 
the same offer and the player 
choosing the city he wants to 
play in.  While this could lead 
teams to give even more assets 
away to create more cap space 
in some situations, it must be 
taken into consideration that a 
player like LeBron James 
would not sign for a team with 
little talent if he was also tak-
ing up the bulk of their re-
maining cap space. 
 
Remove the Midlevel Excep-
tion 
 
  As dominant as a few super-
stars may be together, they 
still need to be surrounded by 
a quality supporting cast in order to con-
tend for a title.  Teams such as the Heat 
who spend all of their cap space on stars 
hope to fill out the rest of their roster via 
the midlevel exception.  The midlevel 
exception allows each team to spend 
nearly 6 million dollars on the first year 
of one free agent‘s contract per offseason, 
even if the team is already over the cap.  
Eliminating this possibility to teams 
would make signing superstars less ap-
pealing since it would be more difficult to 
compile an adequate supporting cast 
while remaining under the salary cap.  
Thus, eliminating the midlevel exception 
would reduce the number of teams who 
would be willing to gut their roster to 
potentially sign a superstar to a large con-
tract since it would become harder to win 
a title with a superstar taking up so much 
cap space.          
 Adding these rules to the next 
collective bargaining agreement would 
make superstars less appealing for NBA 
teams.  In turn, teams would be much less 
likely to gut their roster to sign a super-
star since there would be less incentive to 
add such a player.  As a result, less teams 
would be losing money.  Considering the 
unusually high amount of talent that is in 
the league at the moment, these rules 
would let the league to thrive.   
Lebron James was awarded a maximum contract 
under the NBA’s current collective bargaining  agree-
ment , but his actual value was much higher. A higher 
maximum contract would force teams to strategize 
more carefully since they would be paying closer to 
his real value.  
The absence of a franchise tag in the NBA forced the 
Denver Nuggets to trade their star player, Carmelo 
Anthony, to the New York Knicks. 
What’s Wrong with the NBA? 
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The business     
model of the National Basketball Associ-
ation has met its demise. The current Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), set 
to expire on June 30, 2011, is perceived 
to give management the raw end of the 
deal. Guaranteed contracts, soft salary 
caps, and inefficient revenue sharing have 
made it difficult for small market teams 
to attract elite players. As a result, the 
NBA has been dominated by the same top 
teams, with near bankruptcy for others. 
At the end of the 2010-11 season, this 
reality will come crashing down. Of the 
many proposed solutions to this problem, 
the implementation of the franchise tag is 
the most viable option for the next NBA 
CBA, as it will help close the talent-gap 
between wealthy large market teams and 
struggling small market teams. 
The flaws of the current NBA 
business model are evident in the lop-
sided success of various organizations 
over the past decade. Since 2001, ten 
teams have made it to the NBA Finals, 
with only five unique teams claiming the 
title. In comparison, over that same 
stretch, the National Football League has 
seen seven different teams win a ring out 
of the 14 that made it to the Super Bowl, 
while Major League Baseball has 
crowned a remarkable nine different 
champions.  
According to Forbes magazine, 
12 organizations operated at a loss during 
the 2008-09 season as owners and fans 
adjusted to the recession. The players, 
however, did not cut back. Fans stayed 
home as organizations watched their be-
loved stars flee for larger markets that 
could meet their large contract demands. 
In the subsequent years, numerous big 
name free agents and upcoming free 
agents — Baron Davis, Ron Artest, Ama-
r‘e Stoudemire, LeBron James, Chris 
Bosh, and Car-
melo Anthony — 
have decided 
their own desti-
nies, essentially 
hand picking 
where they 
wished to play 
with little regard 
for the team they 
leave behind.  
Smaller markets 
like in Carolina, Texas, New Orleans, 
Oakland, Cleveland, and Denver, which 
have seen championship caliber teams in 
other arenas have watched their super-
stars take off for the glamour, fame, and 
paycheck of Los Angeles, Boston, New 
York, and Miami. 
The first step in putting the NBA 
on track is a CBA that fosters a level 
playing field. Hard salary caps, abolish-
ment of the luxury tax, and improved 
revenue sharing can give the smaller mar-
kets a better chance to retain their super-
stars. More important, however, is deal-
 
The Impact of an NBA Franchise Tag 
How adopting this NFL system could help save the NBA 
By Alfonse Muglia, ILR ‘ 14  
arm267@cornell.edu 
Since 2001, ten teams have made it to the 
NBA Finals, with only five unique teams 
claiming the title. 
A franchise tag would allow teams like Cleveland and Toronto to protect super-
star players like LeBron James and Chris Bosh. Had there been a franchise tag, 
it’s unlikely Miami’s ―Big Three‖ would have ever been formed. 
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The Impact of an NBA Franchise Tag 
ing with the upper-hand players currently 
hold in contract negotiations. Guaranteed 
contracts, maximum salaries, and player 
option contracts have created an atmos-
phere in which free agency is embraced 
and highlighted by the media, particularly 
during the past year and a half. 
Under this mod-
el, small markets, in es-
sence, have the length of 
their rookie superstar‘s 
contract to prove that the 
organization can be a title 
contender or face the 
possibility of losing said 
player to free agency. 
36.7 percent of players 
selected in the top 10 of 
the NBA Draft between 2004 and 2006 
still play for the team with which they 
signed their rookie contract. The possible 
cause? Only one of the teams with a top 
10 selection from 2004 to 2006 has won a 
championship, with the exception being 
the Los Angeles Lakers, which selected 
Andrew Bynum tenth overall in the 2005 
draft. Meanwhile, more than half of the 
12 teams that Forbes magazine said to 
have lost money in the 2008-09 had at 
least one top-10 pick during this three 
year span. 
The question then arises: is NBA 
management responsible for helping these 
teams compete? After all, Game 7 of the 
2010 NBA Finals between Los Angeles 
and Boston was the most watched Finals 
game since Michael Jordan led the Bulls 
in 1998. Perhaps having the same big 
market teams compete for the champion-
ship is better for the league.   That being 
said, the NFL has decided to help the 
little guy, with CBA amendments such as 
a strict salary cap and franchise tag to 
help maintain a level playing field. 
The NFL franchise tag is a CBA 
provision that allows an organization to 
tag one of their impending free agents, 
thus signing that player for a one year 
contract equal to the average contract of 
the top five salaries at the player‘s posi-
tion. Since its implementation in 1993, 
the tag has given many teams which oth-
erwise would have been unable to main-
tain a star an extra year to negotiate a 
long-term deal or trade. It helps keep a 
team relevant as it continues to put to-
gether a championship caliber squad, 
while avoiding the tough rebuilding peri-
od commonly associated with losing a 
star player. 
As is often the case, players are 
disappointed that they lack the security of 
a longer deal and are pressured into hav-
ing an especially good season, since they 
will once again be up for a new contract 
at season‘s end. Players in return enjoy a 
fairly modest one-year salary. Under the 
NFL model, teams can also issue non-
exclusive franchise tags, giving other 
teams the right to sign the player, but 
with compensation involved. Given the 
current model of the NBA, the franchise 
tag would prove to assist small market 
teams in keeping their players. If the 
NBA was to adopt this model, perhaps 
the Cleveland Cavaliers would not have 
been left completely broken after the Mi-
ami Heat signed LeBron James. 
The notion of forcing players to 
stay with a team they do not wish to play 
for would not be received favorably by 
the NBA Players Association in labor 
disputes. So what needs to be done to 
make this provision a reality? The owners 
would need to make concessions that 
would prove to the NBA Player Associa-
tion that this is in a player‘s best interest. 
Perhaps set the salary as the average of 
the top three highest paid players at that 
position, rather than the NFL‘s model of 
the top five. Removing the maximum 
salary model that currently exists in the 
NBA would create a free market in free 
agency and perhaps even increase the 
salary of tagged players since the top 
players would be getting paid more. In 
the NFL a player can be tagged for multi-
ple years. Perhaps the NBA should begin 
by limiting the number of times a player 
can be tagged to any association to one 
season. With such provisions, a player is 
not locked into an organization for his 
career, while he also is not almighty in 
determining his fate. 
The provision would merely 
postpone the eventual departure of star 
players, who are unhappy with their or-
ganization. Yet it will give the team at 
least one more year of that player‘s ser-
vices and thus, one more year to be com-
petitive. Despite the dissatisfaction that 
NFL players have often expressed regard-
ing the franchise tag, it is important to 
note that in the current NFL labor dis-
putes the NFLPA is not advocating the 
removal of the tag in the new CBA. 
To achieve substantial change in 
the next NBA CBA, an equal playing 
field for large and small market teams 
must be reached. Hard salary caps, abol-
ishment of the luxury tax, and 
improved revenue sharing give 
smaller market teams a better 
chance to retain their super-
stars. More importantly, how-
ever, the NBA must address 
the dominant bargaining power 
players currently hold in con-
tract negotiations. Implement-
ing the franchise tag in the new 
CBA is a small step toward the 
league showing a desire to give small 
market teams a chance against their big 
town rivals. But perhaps even more im-
portant, is the fact that the franchise tag 
can correct a major flaw in the current 
model of the NBA, which allows players 
to be in complete control of their destiny 
with little regard for the organization, 
fans, and community they leave behind. 
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When     spring 
arrives on college campuses, most nine-
teen year-olds are concerned about find-
ing a date for their formal, not an agent 
for the NBA Draft. However, most nine-
teen year-olds also aren't blessed with a 
seven-foot wingspan or a forty-inch verti-
cal leap. While Gumby-like arms or the 
ability to jump out of the gym can make a 
prospect highly intriguing, would that 
negate the fact that this same player may 
have only averaged 7 points per game in 
college? As basketball has evolved into a 
numbers-driven universe, measurables 
depicting raw athleticism have somehow 
become more heavily valued than simple 
statistics that portray real, tangible skill. 
This can ultimately be attributed to the 
fact that many college players make the 
jump to the pros before their physical 
promise translates to on-court success. 
Thus, NBA general managers are left 
with small sample sizes to assess talent 
and must forecast a player's upside, then 
extrapolate the predicted path of develop-
ment to reach it. Sometimes they are cor-
rect, yet many times that potential is bare-
ly tapped at all. Filled with inexperience, 
the NBA Draft has become a projection-
based gamble for front offices. Yes, early 
entry for the draft has long been a contro-
versial issue, yet the debate has never 
been so prevalent. While early entry con-
tributes to the draft becoming a high 
stakes crapshoot, its effects also permeate 
into the NCAA. College basketball has 
seen a weakening of not only its talent 
pool, but also its revered traditions. This 
article will thoroughly examine early en-
try into the draft; we will address the ef-
fects the current policy has on the NCAA, 
NBA, and athletes in addition to propos-
ing feasible solutions to this issue, given 
the contemporary culture of basketball. 
  
History 
  
 The debate over players‘ eligi-
bility to enter the NBA Draft is nothing 
new to the sport. The league originally 
prevented players from entering until four 
years removed from high school. Howev-
er, this rule has been modified over the 
years. 
The first major challenge to this 
clause lay in the U.S. Supreme Court case 
of Haywood v. National Basketball Asso-
ciation in 1971. Upon dominating ABA 
play after his sophomore season at the 
University of Detroit, Spencer Haywood 
signed a six-year deal with the Seattle 
SuperSonics of the NBA. After the NBA 
threatened to void the deal due to Hay-
wood‘s age, he fought back with an anti-
trust action against the NBA, claiming 
that the league‘s draft policy was a re-
straint on trade violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. 
Haywood‘s resilience caused the 
rule to be rescinded and the road was 
paved for future prep-to-pro superstars 
like Kobe Bryant, Kevin Garnett, Robert 
Swift, and LeBron James. Care to guess 
which player doesn‘t belong in the afore-
mentioned group? For every success story 
like Garnett or Dwight Howard, there 
were fallouts like Swift, Gerald Green, or 
Kwame Brown. Throughout their young 
careers, these players didn‘t need to give 
much of an effort – they dominated 
against pre-pubescent boys by relying on 
their uncanny natural abilities (rather than 
a fine-tuned post-up game, for example). 
Many of them were simply not prepared 
for the physical and mental commitment 
that is mandatory to succeed in the Asso-
ciation, and a change was necessary.  
That change came in July 2005, 
when a new Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment stated that players must be at least 
19 years of age or at least one year re-
moved from high school in order to enter 
the NBA Draft. While high school phe-
noms could no longer skip college entire-
ly, many of them have predetermined 
their jump to the NBA after one year of 
NCAA play. The ―prep-to-pro‖ star has 
now been replaced by the ―one-and-done‖ 
draftee. 
  
Effects on NCAA 
  
There was a time when college 
basketball was arguably as glorified and 
admired as the pros. The legacies and 
nostalgia created by the dynasties of 
Duke in the early 90‘s and John Wood-
en‘s UCLA Bruins not only seem like 
ancient memories, but are also unachieva-
ble given the current culture of the sport. 
With the existing rules in place, high 
school stars exploit college programs as a 
way to manipulate the draft policy and 
use the NCAA as a mere bridge to pros; 
to these players, college ball is viewed as 
an inconvenience that lies in the way of 
their first lucrative contract. If Michigan‘s 
1991 freshmen ―Fab Five‖ existed in 
2011, it would have been the sophomore 
―Dynamic Duo‖ by 2012 (It‘s hard to 
imagine Juwan Howard was only in his 
mid-forties back then). When these play-
ers hastily jump to the NBA, they fail to 
recognize the underlying effects it has on 
their ex-teammates, coaches, 
and the NCAA itself. 
First off, early entry into the 
draft has led to a diminishing 
overall field of talent in col-
lege ball. With the best col-
lege players departing for the 
NBA, a glaring scarcity of talent is conse-
quently left behind. This trend was most 
evident during the 2011 NCAA season, 
one of the most unconventional in recent 
memory. Even after finishing just 9th in 
the Big East during the regular season, 
UConn was able to take home a National 
Championship. Additionally, Virginia 
Commonwealth was somehow primed for 
a Final Four run even after regular season 
losses to juggernauts like James Madison 
and Georgia State. Taking it one step 
further, it‘s also likely that Jimmer Fre-
dette and Kemba Walker (two players 
barely deemed borderline first round pro-
spects before that season) would not have 
Spencer Haywood was involved in a land- 
mark case in which he challenged the 
NBA’s eligibility rules. Haywood won the 
case, paving the way for future prep-to-pro 
draftees.  
One and Dumb? 
Filled with inexperience, the NBA 
Draft has become a projection-
based gamble for front offices. 
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captivated the national audience if college 
standouts like John Wall, DeMarcus 
Cousins, and Derrick Favors had decided 
to stay for their sophomore years.  These 
developments all stem from the conse-
quences of early entry. 
Furthermore, it‘s not only the 
quality of individual talent that is suffer-
ing in the NCAA, but also the quality of 
team play. As elite college basketball 
programs have become temporary stints 
for athletes, it has resulted in a lack of 
cohesion amongst teams. On the other 
end of the spectrum, schools that play in 
mid-major conferences have a foundation 
that thrives on continuity. Upsets during 
March Madness such as Butler‘s return to 
the National Championship can be ac-
credited to this fact. Bob Huggins, the 
head coach of West Virginia University‘s 
men‘s basketball team, argues that this 
scenario has resulted in the parity of col-
lege basketball. He notes that at an elite 
school, ―you're coaching guys for two 
years and then all of a sudden you have to 
go and retool again.‖ He adds, ―I think 
that teams that stay together and ... under-
stand each other and how to play... are 
very, very good. And they're very diffi-
cult for anybody to beat.‖ 
Although fans love to see the 
upsets that constitute the spirit of March 
Madness, one cannot help but think of the 
possible what-ifs that might have oc-
curred without the current restrictions (or 
lack thereof). Take, for example, the 
domino effect that was created by John 
Calipari‘s tenures at Memphis and Ken-
tucky. In each of the past four years, 
Calipari has recruited a highly touted 
point guard that stayed for only a one-
year stint and was a top 10 pick in his 
respective draft. If Derrick Rose had re-
turned for his sophomore year after the 
2007-2008 season, then it is unlikely that 
Tyreke Evans would have played at 
Memphis the ensuing year. The same 
case can be made for Evans: if he hadn‘t 
also been a one-and-done player, then 
perhaps Calipari wouldn‘t have left Mem-
phis for Kentucky the next season, where 
he recruited John Wall. Finally, Brandon 
Knight probably would have committed 
to a different school if Wall hadn‘t for-
gone his sophomore season. Rather than 
making one school a perennial contender, 
an alteration of the early entry rule could 
help various teams contend. 
Hence, not only would the over-
all collection of talent be stronger in col-
lege basketball, but the dispersion of this 
talent could also be more balanced along 
the collegiate landscape. When people 
consider early entry as an NBA-centered 
issue, they are overlooking the drastic 
repercussion it has on the collegiate level. 
  
Effects on the NBA 
  
Considering the current state of 
the NBA, early entry has posed as a ma-
jor problem, especially for franchises in 
the midst of rebuilding. The NBA is play-
er-driven more so than any other profes-
sional league — with only 12 active spots 
on each roster, a marquee acquisition has 
the chance to immediately shift the bal-
ance of power in the league. This could 
be noted by observing the recent turna-
round of the Miami Heat: one season af-
ter boasting Quentin Richardson and Jer-
maine O‘Neal in their starting lineup and 
getting blown out by the Celtics in the 
first round, Miami replaced them with All
-Stars LeBron James and Chris Bosh to 
join Dwyane Wade, and stomped over 
Boston on their way to reach the NBA 
Finals. 
While the Heat instantly became 
an NBA powerhouse, James‘ and Bosh‘s 
former teams were left in the dust. The 
Cavaliers and Raptors lost their franchise 
cornerstones without any significant com-
pensation and consequently lack the nec-
essary talent to compete. However, it‘s 
not only the prospects of winning that 
attracts players to other teams. As evi-
denced by the current NBA lockout, play-
ers are also driven by a desire to promote 
their brand and increase their global ex-
posure. For example, Deron Williams 
signed to play for the Turkish team Be-
siktas during the lockout and American 
players regularly exploit the FIBA tour-
nament and Summer Olympics with the 
same intentions. Players want to consist-
ently boost their marketability and feel 
that big cities offer a huge advantage in 
NBA 
Only 3 high-schoolers have been the number one overall pick in draft history, and their success ranges from the highs of yearly MVP 
candidates in LeBron James (23) and Dwight Howard (12) to lows such as Kwame Brown (54), a contender for a less prestigious hon-
or — the biggest draft bust of all time.  
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facilitating this growth on a year-round 
basis (we‘re looking at you, Car-
melo).  As a result, teams located in small 
markets are forced to follow a different 
blueprint to build their franchise. 
Instead of free agent signings, 
the key to success for these small market 
teams lies in the NBA Draft, which can 
serve as the great equalizer. Successful 
drafting can propel a team to success. 
This is exemplified in the building of the 
Oklahoma City Thunder, who, under GM 
Sam Presti, were able to build their young 
nucleus through the draft process. Rising 
stars like Kevin Durant, Russell West-
brook, Serge Ibaka, and James Harden are 
all an integral part to this Western Con-
ference contender and are all younger 
than 23. On the other hand, the Charlotte 
Bobcats have lacked success since 
they‘ve failed to capitalize on having 
seven lottery selections since their 2004 
inaugural season. 
The main issue that makes the 
draft process more complex is that early 
entry players come into the league raw 
and unrefined. Rather than these players 
polishing their games, building upon their 
basketball IQ, and solidifying their emo-
tional stability in college, they are left to 
do so in the pros. Consider this: what if a 
large corporation promoted a twenty year 
old intern to be their new CEO? The cor-
porate government explains that he 
showed ―exceptional people skills for a 
kid his age‖ or he ―did that one project 
where he showed great promise, and we 
want to see more of it!‖ Would anyone 
feel confident that this company would 
succeed with a kid at the helm who has to 
learn the job on the fly? Of course not! It 
seems that athletics is the only profes-
sional field where these circumstances 
aren‘t deemed absurd. The fast nature of 
the NBA terrain can be incredibly over-
whelming for these kids, and it often re-
sults in more pyrite than gold. 
What has contributed to the in-
creasing difficulty of the draft is the ever-
present tradeoff that teams face from 
picks 1-60: do you take the guy who lacks 
the star power, yet can be a mainstay in 
your rotation for years to come? Or do 
you take a flier on the kid who has as 
good of a chance to be out of the league 
in 5 years as he does of averaging 20+ 
points per game? Many times the former 
can be the better selection than the latter. 
The dilemma of drafting a player 
doesn‘t end on draft night, either. Prob-
lems arise upon the expiration of their 
first contract they‘ve waited so long for. 
When players get drafted, they are signed 
according to the NBA rookie scale 
(subject to change under new CBA): the 
first two years are guaranteed, and then 
teams can pick up additional third and 
fourth year options. Even if teams are 
unsatisfied with the development of their 
prospect, they have invested so much 
time, money, and hope into him, that 
they‘ll pick up the options regardless. 
Once his contracts expire after the fifth 
year, he may soon be approaching his 
prime at 23 or 24 years old. Upon hitting 
the open market, teams will make bids 
and drive up the price of his contract. 
This is where a second predicament 
comes into play: should the original team 
that spent all kinds of resources develop-
ing this player simply allow him to go 
another team? As a result, teams are left 
shelling out substantial contracts, over-
paying these players, and diminishing 
their cap flexibility. These players are 
now a financial burden:  they are role 
players that are severely overpaid, and 
now the team can be dug in a hole for 
multiple seasons (Marvin Williams, any-
one?). 
 
Possible Solutions 
  
 This offseason, the NBA Play-
ers‘ Association and the owners have the 
arduous task of agreeing upon a new Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement. The ef-
fects of early entry, in both the NCAA 
and NBA, can be combated by revisions 
to the current CBA. Some possible revi-
sions include a restructured D-League, a 
franchise tag, and a two-year college re-
quirement. 
 
Improved D-League 
  
 A revamped Developmental 
League that resembles an MLB-like farm 
system is a practical idea. While the 
NBDL aims to foster the growth of young 
players, it is essentially underutilized and 
mishandled. Currently, there is little inte-
gration between NBA teams and their D-
League affiliates, especially in compari-
son to the MLB and NHL. Perhaps the D-
League can redistribute their NBA affili-
ates so that there are 2 NBA affiliates for 
every NBDL team. There are 32 NBA 
teams and 16 NBDL teams; however 
there isn‘t perfect distribution across the 
league (some teams have 1 NBA affiliate 
while others have 3). Moreover, NBA 
teams should be encouraged to send their 
younger prospects to the D-League to 
begin their career similar to the way base-
ball prospects work their way up. It seems 
pretty rational to think that some players 
would benefit more with NBDL competi-
tion rather than riding the pine 48 minutes 
a night the NBA. Another idea is that the 
D-League could also be used for injured 
players to rehab, similar to how baseball 
teams use AAA baseball. Not only would 
this help the progression of NBA players, 
but it would also help generate revenue 
for the developmental teams that are lo-
cated in remote areas such as North Da-
kota, Iowa, and Idaho. 
                Another potential solution 
could be to alter the drafting format. One 
way to do so would be to add a third 
round to the draft. There are 7 rounds of 
drafting in the NFL and up to 50 rounds 
in the MLB, compared to only 2 rounds 
in the NBA. Though there are much more 
roster spots to fill in these leagues, this 
third round could possibly go hand-in-
hand with a revamped Developmental 
League. Players drafted in this hypothet-
ical third round could be signed to D-
League contracts if they decide to spurn 
offers from European squads. Not only 
would this make the D-League more rele-
vant with recognizable big names from 
college basketball, but their chances of 
signing with an NBA team would be sig-
nificantly enhanced more so than they 
would by being an overseas journeyman. 
Austin Rivers, an incoming freshman for 
the Duke Blue Devils, has made public 
remarks against the age requirement in the 
NBA, and is widely expected to enter the 
draft after just one year in college.  
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For example, at the end of the 2011 NBA 
Draft, international men of mystery like 
Ater Majak and Tanguy Ngombo (who 
was later discovered to be 26 years old) 
heard their names called while college 
studs like Ben Hansbrough and David 
Lighty were left waiting undrafted. Both 
may eventually be given an opportunity 
to make an NBA team, but an additional 
round in the draft would have them for-
mally tied to a team already. Additional-
ly, we could see teams taking more risks 
in this final round due to the minimal 
financial commitment. While the rookie 
contract scale would also have to be dras-
tically altered, this possible extra round 
should be explored during CBA negotia-
tions.     
 
Franchise Tag 
  
While an NBA franchise tag 
would have no direct effect on early en-
try, it could alleviate some of its effects. 
As previously mentioned, when players 
leave during free agency, their former 
teams are then left searching for answers. 
These teams can either rebuild by relying 
on the draft or by overpaying for players 
who may not necessarily want to play 
there but can‘t leave that kind of cash on 
the table (don‘t worry, we didn‘t forget 
about you, Baron Davis and Rashard 
Lewis). But what if these teams had a 
way to retain their elite players and avoid 
this steep downfall? That is where the 
franchise tag can come into play. Used 
exclusively in the NFL, Chad Ford of 
ESPN.com reported that many GMs are 
proponents of integrating it into the NBA, 
too. He quoted one GM in saying, ―It 
would be a huge coup for the owners if 
we can get this done. Not only would it 
give some modicum of control back to 
teams, but it would also help us to reduce 
costs by ending the bidding wars that 
have been taking place on the higher-end 
players.‖ If this were employed by the 
NBA, then the Magic would certainly be 
able to retain Dwight Howard beyond the 
2011-2012 season (or at least buy them-
selves more time to negotiate trades for 
him), and it‘s possible that  LeBron James 
could have been the recipient of many 
Kyrie Irving alley-oops in Cleveland 
(even with James, Cleveland still 
could‘ve had the first pick since it was 
traded to them by the Clippers). Hence, 
the franchise tag could provide liberation 
and hope to frantic teams with discourag-
ing futures. 
  
Two-Year Requirement 
 
                But what if we instead went 
right to the source of the issue rather than 
having to try to clean up its negative con-
sequences? A recent Yahoo! Sports arti-
cle reported that ―several high-ranking 
NBA team executives wouldn‘t be sur-
prised if the age limit in the new CBA is 
pushed to two years in college and 20 
years old by the end of that calendar 
year.‖ In fact, one NBA general manager 
even claimed ―about two-thirds of teams 
are in favor of that change.‖ Would this 
help solve the current problems in the 
NCAA and NBA? While there would be 
initial backlash, we believe this could be 
the best possible solution. 
                The biggest opponents to this 
change are elite young players who would 
have to wait an extra year to earn that big 
payday. The argument is that if these 
players are good enough to play at the 
next level, why should they be stopped? 
Celtics coach Doc Rivers claims, ―if 
they‘re good enough and they want to 
come out and go through with the draft, 
it‘s hard to tell them no. In any other walk 
of life, the government, you get to go at 
whatever age you are accepted. But for 
us, there is an age limit.‖ Ignoring the fact 
NBA 
As seen in the above graph, the number of underclassmen being taken in the NBA Draft has increased over the past two decades, 
while the amount of seniors selected has steadily declined from 1993-2010.  
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that there is an age minimum to run for 
federal office, he was most likely refer-
ring to his son Austin Rivers who is a 
highly touted incoming Duke guard. Aus-
tin certainly feels the same way and adds, 
―I don‘t think it‘s fair to a lot of guys who 
are ready to go. We‘re going to have guys 
in our class that are going to be ready to 
play after one year.‖ 
                However, what Austin Rivers 
fails to recognize is that the rule wouldn‘t 
be applied to address players like him. 
Rather, it‘s for players like Anthony Ran-
dolph and BJ Mullens. Rivers will be a 
great player in the NBA one day, regard-
less of whether he‘s drafted at 19 or 20 
years old. Yet, not all draftees, despite 
what they‘re told by agents, and what 
they believe, are ready for the NBA after 
one year of college. It‘s hard to believe 
that every early entrant in this year‘s draft 
class wouldn‘t benefit from an extra year 
in college. In truth, what‘s the harm of 
staying one more year? If the precedent is 
set now, then the next basketball prodigy 
will have no need to complain like Riv-
ers. Ten years from now, it will be the 
norm to enjoy two years of development 
in college before entering the draft. 
                The effects of on NCAA bas-
ketball would be monumental. As stated 
by Dave Ryan of SBNation, ―it doesn't 
take a rocket scientist to deduce that hav-
ing more talented players will undoubted-
ly improve the quality and excitement 
level of the game as a whole.‖ As fans, 
we will once again be able to watch play-
ers and teams mature. Maybe there will 
be less upsets, but there will undoubtedly 
be more interest. Who wouldn‘t want to 
see Austin Rivers play two quality years 
under Coach Mike Krzyzewski? Or if this 
rule had already been implemented, think 
of how entertaining a backcourt of Rivers 
and recent Duke one-and-done Kyrie Ir-
ving would have been to watch. Or what 
if Brandon Knight stayed at Kentucky to 
play with Terrence Jones and incoming 
studs Anthony Davis and Michael 
Gilchrist? Would these scenarios not gen-
erate a ton of buzz? 
                Yet this rule would have the 
biggest effect on the NBA, ultimately 
making the job of a GM drastically easier. 
In some cases, incoming draftees who 
would have been ―prep-to-pro‖ players, 
underperformed in their freshman sea-
sons, yet still decide to enter the draft 
regardless. These prospects are the most 
difficult to evaluate. Take, for example, 
Kansas guard and NBA draft prospect 
Josh Selby. Selby attended Kansas Uni-
versity after being ranked the number one 
overall prospect on Rivals.com for his 
incoming class. After serving a 9 game 
suspension at the beginning of the season, 
Selby underwhelmed greatly by shooting 
an inadequate 37% from the field and 
many questions arose: Does he have seri-
ous character concerns that could damage 
team chemistry? Was his subpar play a 
result of rust, or is he simply not a prem-
ier player? Is he able to play point guard 
and orchestrate an offense rather than 
being an undersized combo guard in the 
NBA? If so, is he able to develop these 
qualities to run the point? Or, above all 
else, is he still a legit prospect whose play 
suffered because his style was a misfit in 
the Jayhawks‘ offense?  Despite the num-
ber of questions surrounding Selby, he 
still decided to make the leap to the NBA 
based purely off of his hype and reputa-
tion. While these questions may never be 
answered for certain, the most accurate 
way to make a conclusion would be to 
increase the sample size — by making a 
second year mandatory for players.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Some of you may have read this 
article and feel we are overreacting to the 
current basketball environment. Maybe 
we are. The past year‘s draft was one of 
the worst NBA drafts in recent memory, 
but next year‘s will be vastly improved. 
By implementing our proposed solutions 
into the newest Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, we believe the benefits would 
far outweigh the prospective detri-
ments. Yes, this may hold back some 
talented players from entering the league, 
but it also raises the level of play in col-
lege and gives NBA teams a better 
chance to succeed. Maybe the advantages 
of a second collegiate season have al-
ready been recognized by former fresh-
men like Harrison Barnes, Perry Jones, 
and Jared Sullinger who are all returning 
for their sophomore seasons. However, it 
is more likely that these players‘ deci-
sions were a result of the looming labor 
strife, and the uncertainty of their rookie 
years. The NBA needs to get its priorities 
straight. What should be a more urgent 
concern for the NBA: getting Austin Riv-
ers in an NBA uniform next year, or find-
ing ways to mitigate the disparity that 
exists between teams like the Heat and 
Bobcats? You decide. 
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  For the last 57 
years, the Ivy League has served as the 
standard against which academic institu-
tions of higher education in the United 
States are judged. Excelling in research, 
job placement and unique intellectual 
thought, it is no wonder these schools 
have drawn the lustful gaze of students 
and professors from across the globe. 
     Yet as successful as the An-
cient Eight have been in the classroom, 
they have been equally embarrassing in 
revenue-generating sports. In fact, before 
Cornell‘s Sweet 16 run last season, it had 
been 31 years since an Ivy League school 
made it to the second weekend of the 
NCAA basketball tournament. For these 
eight institutions that pride themselves on 
excellence, why not give out athletic 
scholarships to actually establish compet-
itive teams? Due to the added reputation-
al, economical and social benefits of a 
stronger sports program, the Ivy League 
should finally award scholarships based 
on athletic prowess. 
     Prior to the formation of the 
league, many of the Ivy schools enjoyed 
great successes on the sports field. During 
the 1920 and 1921 seasons, Penn came 
away with back-to-back national basket-
ball titles. Between 1921 and 1939, Cor-
nell recorded four undefeated football 
seasons en route to four national champi-
onships. And from 1921 to 1940, Prince-
ton won an incredible nine national cham-
pionships in collegiate soccer, a number 
matched only by the Quakers who them-
selves earned eleven. During the infant 
stages of today‘s biggest revenue-
generating sports, Ivy League schools 
were powerhouse programs. 
     Then in 1923, the ―Big Three‖ 
schools of Harvard, Yale and Princeton 
fashioned a change that would ripple 
through the remaining five institutions. 
Signing the President‘s Agreement, the 
three formed a pact to refrain from athlet-
ic scholarships, prevent recruitment of 
prep-school athletes, deny transfer stu-
dents athletic eligibility, promote a volun-
teer-only coaching staff, and restrict sum-
mer training to only the week prior to the 
start of classes. Promoting amateurism 
and the importance of education, this 
agreement established a sense of the 
―scholar athlete‖ that would become the 
model upon which the Ivy League was to 
be formed. The message was clear: 
school was to come first with athletics a 
distant second. 
     With the formation of the 
league 31 years later in 1954, the spirit of 
the President‘s agreement was main-
tained. All eight schools banned athletic 
scholarships. Schedules were limited 
strictly to the school year, and programs 
like football were forced to end before the 
start of December. While sports were still 
important enough to be played, they were 
relegated to a level that resembled an 
extracurricular student activity rather than 
a serious, competitive team. 
      Through this set of agree-
ments, the Ivy League lost something 
incredibly important to its past: reputa-
tion. The Ancient Eight have a rich histo-
ry of success in today‘s revenue-
generating sports and by giving out ath-
letic scholarships, these programs could 
very well rebuild themselves into national 
contenders. The recruiting tactics of hav-
ing stellar academics and athletics could 
bring in some of the best talent in the 
nation (as per Duke or Stanford), and 
alumni support would be substantial. 
There is no question that history could 
repeat itself with the addition of athletic 
scholarships, and that the Ivy League 
could once again be a perennial contender 
in national competition. 
 
Scholarships in Ivy Athletics 
 
The Ivy League has long refused to admit students at a discounted rate  to play collegiate 
athletics. As a result, these programs that were at one point dominant are  now failing to 
keep up with schools that are willing to mark down tuition for gifted athletes. Should the 
Ivy League revise its policy and begin to offer scholarships based on athletic ability? 
Andrew Margius, Duke ’ 13  
atm16@duke.edu 
Gil Dobie, Cornell’s head football coach 
from 1920 to 1935, presided over three 
consecutive undefeated seasons from 
1921 to 1923. 
 22 Sports, Inc.   
     Then there is the universal 
issue of money. The Ivy League certainly 
has the ability to generate revenue from 
sports. Seven of the eight institutions 
have demographics large enough to sup-
port competitive Division I football and 
basketball programs. 
Providence, Cam-
bridge and Philadel-
phia are large sports 
markets with room 
to support additional 
universities. New 
Haven, Ithaca and 
Princeton are all 
areas with minimal 
professional athletic 
influence, yet still 
carry large enough populations to support 
a major program. And New York — the 
single largest city in the country without a 
competitive Division I football program 
— could easily bring in enough profits 
alone to support the entire league. How‘s 
that for getting more research funding? 
     In this same vein, athletic 
scholarships can enhance the perception 
of the Ivy League as a champion for eco-
nomic mobility. At the moment, many 
Ivy athletes come from privileged prep-
school backgrounds. A quick look at the 
football rosters on YaleBulldogs.com or 
BrownBears.com reveals a substantial 
amount of athletes from schools such as 
Phillips Academy and Choate Rosemary 
Hall. Given preferred admission in which 
the academic standards are slightly low-
ered, athletes can be admitted to the 
school yet are still required to pay the 
expensive price tag. For underprivileged 
athletes that maintain strong 
academic standards, it 
makes little sense to pay 
some out of pocket expens-
es when they can go to 
school for free. Try con-
vincing such an athlete to 
come to an Ivy for $10,000 
a year when he could just as 
easily attend Rice or Van-
derbilt without paying a 
dime. Keeping athletic 
scholarships off the table perpetuates a 
divide between the rich and poor athletes 
in the Ivy League, a problem that surely 
is unhealthy for the schools and their ath-
letic programs. 
Half-filled stadiums are not uncommon across the Ivy League due to flagging fan interest; offering scholarships can help make Ivy 
League teams more relevant to boost attendance figures and, by extension, revenue.  
For underprivileged athletes that maintain strong 
academic standards, it makes little sense to pay 
some out of pocket expenses when they can go to 
school for free. 
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     Finally, from the perspective 
of the students, sports also provide a great 
balance to academic life. Sure there is the 
talk of the ―scholar athlete‖ and how 
training and competition impact the ath-
lete himself, but there is a positive exter-
nality felt by the majority of the student 
body. It is not difficult to see that when 
schools have a successful sports team, the 
sense of community amongst the fans 
becomes palpable and unifies the student 
body. The excitement of bowl season or 
March Madness is magnified when one‘s 
alma mater is participating in the action. 
With this in mind, it‘s easy to understand 
why studies have shown that the success 
of institutions such as Stanford, Duke and 
Northwestern on the field has helped fos-
ter higher application rates and lower 
acceptance rates. All three of these 
schools are aided by the visibility and 
recognition that is afforded them by re-
peated success in athletics. Sports en-
hance the college experience for the en-
tirety of the student body and make the 
school more attractive to prospective stu-
dents. Athletic scholarships have the po-
tential to influence much more than on-
field performance. 
     Continuing with this pattern, 
strong athletic programs may be a huge 
benefit in the race to acquire the best raw 
intellectual talent. There are only a hand-
ful of schools that have high quality ath-
letic and academic programs. Without the 
sports component that other institutions 
offer, the Ivy League could lose some of 
its leverage in acquiring the best incom-
ing classes from this select group. Sure 
the allure of the Ancient Eight has main-
tained a strong appeal in the past. But as 
the perception of the media and values of 
the next generation change, it makes 
sense for the Ivy League to evolve with it.   
     In the end, the Ivy League has 
the excuses necessary to maintain the 
status quo and keep athletics relegated to 
a second rate activity. The high startup 
costs of expanding or rebuilding stadiums 
provide one outlet for those in opposition. 
The fact that profitability will take years 
to come to fruition only bolsters their 
argument. For many Ivy presidents, ath-
letics are seen as more of an inconven-
ience than a tie to past successes. ―We‘re 
in the middle of the Ivy pack,‖ Columbia 
president Lee C. Bollinger stated in his 
November discussion panel, ―And that‘s 
good.‖ As for the enhancement to student 
life, opponents would claim that current 
presence of athletics already provides a 
complete collegiate experience. In their 
view the successes of hockey and lacrosse 
are enough of an outlet for students, thus 
making football and basketball enhance-
ment unnecessary. 
     The dream of a dominant ath-
letic Ivy League may be nothing more 
than just that, a distant fantasy with little 
hope of reality. Administrators may be-
lieve that the cost of beginning competi-
tive programs is an unnecessary financial 
risk. They may believe that the current 
sports format is enough to suffice the 
student appetite for sports. They may 
believe that the historical legacy of the 
Ivy League as the premier academic insti-
tutions may be enough to get by for gen-
erations to come. But for students seeking 
a balanced collegiate experience, this 
perception may be fading. For the best 
and brightest, college should be every-
thing that it can be. Life is never one-
dimensional. It‘s time the Ivy League 
took notice and evolved to meet the 
changing times. 
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Offering athletic scholarships results in a positive externality felt by all students should it 
make the team become successful. For example, Duke’s success on the basketball court 
has resulted in an added entertainment and communal value for the student body since 
the early 1980s. Today, the Duke student section – known as the Cameron Crazies – has 
made Cameron Indoor Stadium one of the most difficult venues for visiting opponents.  
Sure there is the talk of the scholar athlete and 
how training and competition impact the athlete 
himself, but there is a positive externality felt by 
the majority of the student body 
College Sports 
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 What do the 1969 
Baltimore Colts, 2007 Michigan Wolver-
ines, and the 2008 New England Patriots 
have in common?  First and foremost, 
they were all great football teams that had 
established themselves as national power-
houses and were dripping with tal-
ent.  Unfortunately for them, these are not 
the reasons they will be remembered for-
ever in sports history.  These teams will 
be discussed and analyzed by experts and 
fans alike because each was on the losing 
end of  one of the greatest upsets in foot-
ball history.  How can anyone forget the 
miraculous over-the-head catch that Da-
vid Tyree made to secure a first down for 
the Giants on that famous last drive in 
Super Bowl XLII over the Patriots?  Or 
the dramatic finish to the Michigan-
Appalachian State game where Corey 
Lynch blocked a field goal to win the 
game?  The point is that these games 
were so memorable and dramatic because 
the teams who won them came in as huge 
underdogs.  In the Michigan-Appalachian 
State game, some Vegas odds makers 
thought the game was so lopsided that 
they refused to even put a line on it, and 
the Patriots were expected to win by near-
ly two touchdowns.  Therefore, what I am 
going to do in this article is provide a few 
key reasons that will help explain why 
teams with so much talent and so many 
resources can lose to opponents that they 
are supposed to easily handle.   
 It was a beautiful and crisp fall 
day in Ann Arbor, and the 104,173 Wol-
verine faithful in attendance for the first 
game of the 2007 season had a lot to be 
excited about.  Not only did longtime 
coach Lloyd Carr decide to come back for 
another season, but offensive stalwarts 
Chad Henne, Jake Long, and Mike Hart 
(who are all now in the NFL) made the 
decision to return for their senior sea-
son.  The Wolverines were the clear fa-
vorites to win the Big Ten title, and may-
be even make a bid for the national cham-
pionship.  They just needed to get by low-
ly Division I-AA Appalachian State, who 
had long been a doormat for powerhouse 
division I opponents.  The game began 
with a Michigan 66 yard kick return fol-
lowed by an easy Mike Hart touchdown 
run.  The matchup began to feel as it was 
expected to: a blowout. However, Michi-
gan played sloppily throughout the rest of 
the game, and Appalachian State began to 
wear the out-of-shape Wolverines down 
with their no-huddle spread of-
fense.  Soon enough, Appalachian State 
came out with one of the greatest upsets 
in sports history.   
 Why did it happen?  Some have 
said that Michigan played a great Appala-
chian State team.  However, even a great 
division I-AA team could not compete 
with a Michigan roster that was full of 
blue chip recruits from around the na-
tion.  Therefore, there were two main 
reasons why Appalachian State came out 
with a win at the Big House against 
Michigan.  The first is that the Wolver-
ines came into the game without a strong 
incentive to win.  Appalachian State was 
not in the Big Ten, so there was no addi-
tional motivation to beat them, as a victo-
ry would mean nothing for conference 
standings.  In addition, the game held no 
historical significance like a matchup 
against a team like Notre Dame.  Appala-
chian State was meant to simply be a 
―filler‖ game on the schedule so Michi-
gan could fine-tune their offense and de-
fense for games that had greater mean-
ing.  This scenario, where a team that is 
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the clear favorite plays another team from 
another conference with no historical or 
national meaning, happens most often in 
college sports, as coaches struggle to pro-
vide adequate motivation for their ath-
letes to play to their full potential.   
 A second reason is that Appala-
chian State played in an unconventional 
spread offense that strongly catered to 
their strengths.  Although the team did 
not have a lot of strength or power on 
their roster, they did have speed.  Coach 
Jerry Moore, the mastermind behind the 
upset, designed the offense so that the 
quarterback could release the ball within 
a matter of seconds before the superior 
Michigan defensive line could get to 
him.  Throughout the game, Appalachian 
State preyed on Michigan‘s weak second-
ary by running slant patterns for five to 
seven yard gains.  The strategy worked, 
and, by the end of the game, it seemed as 
though the Appalachian State offense 
could move on Michigan‘s defense at 
will.  Malcolm Gladwell, in How David 
Beats Goliath, asserts that an unconven-
tional strategy like the one used by Appa-
lachian State against Michigan is one of 
the main reasons why any underdog pulls 
off a seemingly improbably victory.  He 
states: ―When underdogs choose not to 
play by [conventional] rules, they win, 
even when everything we know about 
power says they shouldn‘t.‖  Therefore, 
one of the main reasons that Appalachian 
State beat Michigan was because of the 
alternative offense they ran against the 
Wolverines.   
 In addition, John Murray, a 
prominent sports psychologist, argues 
that concentration is an essential part to 
success in football, and that ―players of-
ten lose their focus when tired.‖  Alt-
hough it seems like common sense to tell 
players to merely concentrate, Murray 
argues that it is an essential part of the 
game: ―Concentration is a difficult skill to 
master because our minds tend to shift 
focus when presented with novel stimuli. 
Known as the orienting response, this 
bias toward new sights and sounds alerted 
our ancestors to dangers in the wild, but 
often makes us the prey to meaningless 
distractions on the tennis court. A split 
second loss of concentration during a 
critical point can spell the difference be-
tween winning and losing.‖  Thus, as Ap-
palachian State wore down the out-of-
shape Wolverine defense, they began to 
exploit them more and more and eventu-
ally capitalize on their weaknesses.   
 Although it seemed improbable 
at the time, Appalachian State‘s win was 
the result of careful preparation by the 
coaching staff and a lack of motivation to 
win.  In many upsets of this magnitude, 
this is usually the case, and the favorites 
are sent home losers.  Because, as Pierre 
Corneille once said: ―a victory without 
danger is a triumph without glory.‖   
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 Ever since Devin 
Hester electrified the league during his 
rookie season of 2006, many NFL teams 
are placing a greater emphasis on fielding 
elite kick and punt returners. In 2007, 
perhaps inspired by the Bears‘ success 
with Hester, the Miami Dolphins selected 
Ted Ginn, Jr. with the 9th overall pick. 
Superstars such as Ed Reed of the Balti-
more Ravens are pressed into service as 
returners on special teams. Clearly, teams 
see the kick returner and the field position 
he provides as extremely important; they 
are willing to risk expensive assets such 
as high draft picks or great players by 
exposing them to the injury risks of spe-
cial teams play. But how much more ben-
eficial is a great kick returner compared 
to a bad one? Will the difference in field 
position 
provided by a 
great return 
man be of 
enough value to justify these risks? 
 To answer this question, it is 
perhaps most instructive to look at an 
example of extreme contrast. Among 
eligible kick returners (those with at least 
one return for every game his team 
played) David Reed of Baltimore was the 
best with an average return of 29.3 yards. 
The worst was Darius Reynaud of the 
New York Giants with an average return 
of 18.4 yards (See Figure 1).  Therefore 
the difference between the best NFL kick 
returner and the worst was about 10.9 
yards per return in 2010. If we accept 
62.3 yards to be the average distance of 
an NFL kickoff, a return by the best re-
turner as op-
posed to the worst is, 
on average, the differ-
ence between starting on 
the 37 yard line and starting 
on the 26 yard line (Burke 
―Best‖).  
 So exactly how valuable is this 
difference of about eleven yards? It can 
easily be measured using expected point 
value, a concept first developed by Virgil 
Carter, an NFL quarterback who taught 
statistics and mathematics at Xavier Uni-
versity while an active player for the Cin-
cinnati Bengals (Deseret News). In short, 
expected point value assigns a value to 
each position on the field based on the 
average number of points a team scores 
after a first down from that position. A 
first down on the opponents‘ goal line is 
worth nearly seven points because it al-
most always results in a touchdown and a 
first down on a teams‘ own goal line is 
worth nearly -2 points because it is more 
likely to result in points for the opponent 
than for the offense (Burke ―Expected‖).  
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 Hence, having the ball on the 37 
is worth about 1.2 points while having it 
on the 26 is worth about 0.6 points. This 
makes the difference the best returner 
roughly 0.6 points per kick better than the 
worst. To truly estimate the impact of this 
difference, one must take into account the 
number of kicks the average returner 
fields per game. This number turns out to 
be about 2.6, so the total difference is 
(0.6*2.6) or 1.56 points per game. 
 The result for punt returns isn‘t 
much different. The best punt returner in 
2010 was Devin Hester with an average 
return of 17.1 yards; the worst was once 
again Reynaud of New York with an av-
erage return of 5.7 yards (See Figure 2). 
The difference between these two averag-
es is 11.4 yards which translates again to 
a difference of about 0.6 in points per 
punt, taking into account the fact that the 
graph of expected point value is nearly 
linear for the majority of the field. The 
average punt returner (among eligible 
returners) only fields about 1.9 punts per 
game, making the difference between the 
best punt returner and the worst at some-
where around 1.33 points per game. 
 If you combine the two totals, 
you come up with an impact of about a 
field goal per game if a returner is elite in 
both areas. It is important to remember, 
however, that this is the difference be-
tween the absolute best kick returner and 
the absolute worst; the returns of an aver-
age returner about doubled those of the 
worst kick returner in both punt returns 
and kick returns. With this in mind it is 
probably reasonable to assume that find-
ing a returner that reduces the advantage 
of the elite returner to about a point is not 
all that difficult. Taking all this into ac-
count, it seems as if spending such a high 
pick might be worth it only if you can 
find a player like Devin Hester. The prob-
lem is that it is easy for opponents to re-
duce the value of an elite returner by 
simply kicking away from him. Hester, 
although a very good kick returner in 
2010, was not eligible for this statistical 
evaluation because teams were so wary of 
his return abilities that they rarely let him 
field a kick. For the players that were 
eligible in both categories (that is, they 
were able to field at least 16 punts and 16 
kicks), the highest total impacts per game 
were much closer to 2 points. Despite 
Hester‘s superior returning ability, his 
impact was limited to about 2 points per 
game as well. His average return of 35.6 
yards translates to about 1.5 points per 
game, 0.9 points better than the worst 
kick returner included in the study. Multi-
plying this difference by his low average 
returns per game (0.8) gives us a figure of 
0.72, meaning his total point impact on a 
game (through his returns) can be esti-
mated at about 2 points. We can see in the 
case of Devin Hester, the amount of con-
trol an opposing team has over his value. 
If a player shows the ability to add signif-
icant value through his returns, opposing 
teams should be expected to react by giv-
ing that player fewer opportunities.  
 There are a couple of things that 
should be mentioned about the methodol-
ogy used in this study of returners. First, 
touchdowns were not considered because 
the long yardage totals of a touchdown 
return are factored into the average return 
and, since those yardage totals would 
yield a expected point value of close to 
seven points, they should not significantly 
affect the evaluation. Second, fumbles 
were not included due to inadequate data 
– I was unable to find data that included 
what yard line the fumble occurred at, a 
crucial piece of information without 
which any inclusion of fumbles is useless. 
However, this omission did not affect the 
evaluation since none of the players 
looked at had any fumbles.  
 Based on this study of both kick 
returners and punt returners, it can be 
concluded that although a player might 
NFL 
Virgil Carter developed the concept of Expected  Point Value, which assigns a 
point value to each yard  line based on the number of points a team might ex-
pect to  score given a first down  at that field position. 
Figure 2: Punt Returners 
Figure 1: Kick Returners 
Punt Returner Average Punt Return Punt Returns Per Game 
Devin Hester 17.1 2.1 
Ted Ginn, Jr. 13.4 1.8 
Darius Reynaud 5.7 2.6 
David Reed 0.0 0.0 
Average Returner 9.9 1.9 
Kick Returner Average Kick Return Kick Returns per Game 
David Reed 29.3 1.6 
Devin Hester 35.6 0.8 
Ted Ginn, Jr.  21.1 3.6 
Darius Reynaud 18.4 2.9 
Average Returner 23.8 2.6 
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potentially have a significant impact on 
games as a return specialist, the oppo-
nents ability to neutralize this impact 
makes it seem as though spending large 
amounts of money in free agency or a 
high draft pick would be a mistake. It 
should be noted, however, that this evalu-
ation would probably change if the player 
was able to contribute as both an elite 
returner and contribute some sort of posi-
tive production elsewhere on the field. 
For example, Hester also contributes 
some value as a Wide Receiver, a factor 
that wasn‘t taken into account in this 
analysis. Drafting a player to simply be 
what is sometimes termed as a ―return 
specialist‖, though, would appear to be a 
mistake, mostly because of a returner‘s 
limited opportunity to make an impact on 
games. In most cases, it appears that a 
high pick would be more wisely spent on 
players that play positions that are on the 
field more often and thus impact more 
plays. It might be argued that it is easier 
to assess returners and they are therefore 
less risky investments, but this position is 
unsatisfying due to both the small sample 
(very few players have been drafted high-
ly as a result of their return abilities) and 
the example of Ted Ginn, Jr., who was 
last year a relatively average returner with 
a kickoff return average of 21.1 and a 
punt return average of 13.4.  
 It is also worth noting that this 
study could be changed by the NFL‘s 
implementation of the new rules govern-
ing kickoffs, but it likely will not change 
the conclusion. The new rules state that 
the ball will be placed at the 35 
yard line prior to the kickoff, rather 
than the previously used 30 yard 
line (Clayton). The NFL‘s new 
rules, designed to protect players 
from the violent collisions that of-
ten occur on kick return plays, will 
likely reduce the total number of 
returns, since kickers will be closer 
to the opponent‘s end zone and 
thus, better able to kick a touch-
back. Even in light of these new 
rules, therefore, it seems that a kick return 
specialist‘s value does not merit a high 
draft pick. 
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The Value of a Kick Returner 
Drafting a player to simply be 
what is sometimes referred to 
as a “return specialist” would 
appear to be a mistake, mostly 
because of a returner’s limited 
opportunity to make an impact 
on games. 
It is important to remember that returners such as Ted Ginn, Jr. (Dolphins no. 19)  often contribute value at some other position such 
as wide receiver. 
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